Qubes OS

Nitrokey is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are officially certified for Qubes OS (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html).

In addition, with the conference nearly a week away and on-site tickets over halfway gone, this serves as our last call for tickets! If you’d like to join us in person, please see below for details.

When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Lenaustraße 3-4

12047 Berlin

View on OpenStreetMap (https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/263350430)

Attend in person or online

There are three ways to attend the Summit:


In person at Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Requires a paid on-site ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member


Actively participate online

Requires a free virtual ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
For those who are presenting remotely
For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member


Passively view online

No ticket or registration required
For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and recorded videos
Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member




Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

Conference schedule

The official conference schedule, including a list of sessions and speakers, is available here:

https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/schedule/

Become a sponsor

If you or your organization are interested in sponsoring Qubes OS Summit 2026 or becoming a Qubes Partner (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/), please contact us at [email protected] (mailto:[email protected]).

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/code-of-conduct.html).

Qubes OS Summit 2026: Nitrokey sponsorship; last call for tickets!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/qubes-os-summit-2026-nitrokey-sponsorship-last-call-for-tickets/

We’re proud to announce that Nitrokey (https://www.nitrokey.com/) has joined as a Qubes OS Summit 2026 (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/) Silver-tier sponsor!

Qubes-certified options

The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.

Base Configuration



Certified: Standard (Intel Core i3-N305)


The Plus configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification.



Storage


Certified: All of the available options in these sections


Operating System



Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.1 or newer (within Release 4).


Releases older than 4.3.1 are not certified.


You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.



Disclaimers


As mentioned above, the “Plus” base configuration (Intel Core i5-1334U) has not yet been certified. As of this writing, we have not yet received the unit for testing, but we currently do not anticipate any significant barriers to eventual certification.


What is Qubes-certified hardware?

Qubes-certified hardware (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.

Qubes-certified computers (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.

It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon is Qubes certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starbook-horizon-qubes-certified/

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarBook Horizon (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook-horizon) is officially certified (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html) for Qubes OS Release 4!

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon

The Star Labs StarBook Horizon (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook-horizon) is a 13.4-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, up to 32 GB of memory, Wi-Fi kill switch, integrated webcam cover, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more.

Qubes-certified options

The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.

Base Configuration



Certified: Standard (Intel Core Ultra 5 125H + 32GB LPDDR5X + QHD display)


Certified: Ultra (Intel Core Ultra 9 285H + 64GB LPDDR5X + 4K display)


The AMD configuration is not certified.


Warning: While both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.



Operating System



Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.2 or newer (within Release 4).


Releases older than 4.3.2 are not certified.


You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.



Storage & Additional Storage


Certified: All of the available options in these sections


Disclaimers


As mentioned above, while both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.


What is Qubes-certified hardware?

Qubes-certified hardware (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html) is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific major release (https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/version-scheme/) of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of requirements (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#hardware-certification-requirements), and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.

Qubes-certified computers (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#qubes-certified-computers) are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.

It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware configuration is supported by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) en route to the user.

The Star Labs StarFighter is Qubes certified!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starfighter-qubes-certified/

It is our pleasure to announce that the Star Labs StarFighter (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starfighter) is officially certified (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html) for Qubes OS Release 4!

The Star Labs StarFighter

The Star Labs StarFighter (https://starlabs.systems/pages/starfighter) is a 16-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, disabled Intel ME, up to 64 GB of memory, wireless kill switch, removable webcam, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more.

XSAs released on 2026-10-13
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/13/xsas-released-on-2026-10-13/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-514 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-514.html): Affects only Xen 4.22 or higher; Qubes OS 4.3 uses Xen 4.19. Affects only Xenstore live update, which is not used in Qubes OS.
XSA-515 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-515.html): Up-to-date systems are not affected. Only systems running outdated AMD microcode from before 2023 are affected.
XSA-516 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-516.html): Only systems with 5 TiB of RAM or higher are affected, which is not the target hardware class for Qubes OS.
XSA-517 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-517.html): Grant tables v2 are disabled at build time in Qubes OS.
XSA-518 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-518.html): Denial of service only. In-VM only.
XSA-519 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-519.html): ARM only. Qubes OS does not support ARM.
XSA-520 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-520.html): Denial of service only.
XSA-521 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-521.html): Tapdisk is not used in Qubes OS.


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

XSAs released on 2026-10-09
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/09/xsas-released-on-2026-10-09/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-522 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-522.html): Denial of service only.


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

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Source: qsb-120-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4ea6603c1eb68df12868bf4c97d8efefa8d15799/QSBs/qsb-120-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software).)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1

The software (usually a web browser) accessing a hardware authentication
device (either a real one, or in this case an emulated one that forwards
requests through qrexec) must limit the requests it sends to the device.
For example, if you visit , the browser must ensure
that that site can request authentication only for
. Therefore, in the absence of an additional,
exploitable vulnerability in the browser, a malicious website cannot
exploit either of the vulnerabilities described in this QSB. However,
the intention of the CTAP proxy is (in addition to making CTAP
authentication devices usable in the first place) to restrict the access
that qubes have to authentication devices, such that even if a qube is
compromised, it cannot access credentials on the authentication device
that it has not been given permission to access. The vulnerabilities
described in this QSB affect this latter form of protection.

Note that the RPC policies themselves are correctly enforced, so these
are not vulnerabilities in qrexec. Rather, the problem lies in the CTAP
proxy's implementation of the qrexec services, which breaks the intended
semantics of the (correctly-enforced) RPC policies.

Patching
---------

The following package contains the security update that addresses the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.3, in template for USB qube(s):
- qubes-ctap package, version 2.0.8

This package will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the package should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

In order for the update to take effect, all USB qubes must be restarted
after their respective templates have been updated and shut down.

Credits
--------

Vulnerability 2 was discovered by Giulio Berra of the Freedom of the
Press Foundation.

Vulnerability 1 was discovered internally by Piotr Bartman-Szwarc during
review of the previous report.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/security-in-qubes/ctap-proxy.html
[4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/advanced-topics/usb-qubes.html
[5] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/advanced-topics/rpc-policy.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: qsb-120-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4ea6603c1eb68df12868bf4c97d8efefa8d15799/QSBs/qsb-120-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

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Source: qsb-120-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4ea6603c1eb68df12868bf4c97d8efefa8d15799/QSBs/qsb-120-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

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QSB-120: Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/08/qsb-120/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 120: Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/4ea6603c1eb68df12868bf4c97d8efefa8d15799/QSBs/qsb-120-2026.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 120


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 120 ]===---

2026-10-08

Two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Background
-----------

The Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) is a standard governing the
interoperation of authentication devices, such as hardware security
keys, with client platforms, such as laptops. Qubes OS has a feature
known as the Qubes CTAP proxy [3] that enables a USB authentication
device to be used in a given qube without exposing that qube to the full
USB stack, similar to the way the USB keyboard and mouse proxies [4]
work in Qubes. There are multiple versions of CTAP, different ways it
can be used, and various related components that can work with it, so
there's a variety of other terms that you might see associated with
CTAP, such as U2F, CTAP1, CTAP2, FIDO2, WebAuthn, and passkeys.

Qubes users can write RPC policies [5] to control the way CTAP requests
forwarded through the CTAP proxy are handled. There are various request
types that are handled by different qrexec services: ctap.ClientPin,
ctap.GetInfo, u2f.Authenticate, and u2f.Register. In addition, users can
limit the u2f.Authenticate service to specific credentials by allowing
only specific qrexec service arguments.

Summary
--------

This QSB describes two CTAP proxy vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability 1: CTAP requests are supposed to match their requested
service types, but the CTAP proxy fails to enforce this.

Vulnerability 2: When RPC policies limit a qube to sending requests with
specific service arguments, the u2f.Authenticate service incorrectly
allows that qube to request multiple assertions (used for
authentication) as long as any of them match the allowed service
argument.

Impact
-------

Vulnerability 1: A qube that is allowed access to any of the
CTAP-related qrexec services can send any request type. For example,
even if the policy allows a qube access only to ctap.GetInfo, that qube
can also send an authentication request. In realistic configurations,
this means that argument-based filtering of access to specific
credentials is ineffective, since a qube can send authentication
requests through one of its other allowed services. This vulnerability
affects all CTAP versions.

Vulnerability 2: A qube that is allowed to have access only to specific
credentials on a forwarded authentication device can use any credentials
for CTAP2 (but not CTAP1) assertion requests, thereby enabling it to use
those credentials for authentication even though it should not be
allowed to do so.

Affected systems
-----------------

Since these vulnerabilities affect only the CTAP proxy, only users who
use the CTAP proxy on a supported Qubes release are affected. Users who
do not use the CTAP proxy are not affected.

In practice, the only systems that are affected are those in which the
RPC policies have been configured to restrict a qube's access to a
subset of the credentials available on an authentication device, since
otherwise the qube already (intentionally) has access to all
credentials on the authentication device.

These vulnerabilities were introduced in qubes-ctap package version
2.0.0. Older versions of the package (previously known as qubes-u2f) are
not affected.

Discussion
-----------

Fresh templates on a clean 4.3.2 installation are not affected. Users who perform an in-place upgrade from 4.2 to 4.3 (instead of restoring templates from a backup) are also not affected, since the in-place upgrade process already includes the above fix in stage 4. For more information, see issue #8701 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8701).

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20state%3Aopen%20type%3ABug%20label%3Aaffects-4.3%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22) in our issue tracker (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/issue-tracking.html).

What’s a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as [major].[minor].[patch]. Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.3) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. See our supported releases (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html) documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

Qubes OS 4.3.2 has been released!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/02/qubes-os-4-3-2-has-been-released/

We’re pleased to announce the stable release of Qubes OS 4.3.2! This patch release aims to consolidate all the security updates and bug fixes that have occurred since the previous stable release. Our goal is to provide a secure and convenient way for users to install (or reinstall) the latest stable Qubes release with an up-to-date ISO. The ISO and associated verification files (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html) are available on the downloads (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) page.

Announcements



Qubes OS Summit 2026 (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/) is coming up soon! This year’s Summit will take place from October 30 to November 1 in Berlin.


As a reminder, Qubes 4.2 has reached end of life (EOL) (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/06/21/qubes-os-4-2-has-reached-end-of-life/). If you’re still using Qubes 4.2, we urge you to upgrade to Qubes 4.3 (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/upgrade/4_3.html) immediately.



What’s new in Qubes 4.3.2?


Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 44
kernel-latest upgraded to Linux 7.2
Security updates (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/)
Numerous bug fixes (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20type%3ABug%20label%3A%22affects-4.3%22%20closed%3A2026-06-11..2026-09-18%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22)


For an overview of what’s new in Qubes 4.3, see the Qubes 4.3 release notes (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/developer/releases/4_3/release-notes.html).

How to get Qubes 4.3.2



If you’d like to install Qubes for the first time or perform a clean reinstallation on an existing system, there’s never been a better time to do so! Simply download (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/) the Qubes 4.3.2 ISO and follow our installation guide (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/installation-guide.html).


If you’re currently on Qubes 4.3 (including 4.3.0, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2-rc1), update normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html) (which includes upgrading any EOL templates and standalones (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html#upgrading-to-avoid-eol) you might have) in order to make your system essentially equivalent to the stable Qubes 4.3.2 release. No reinstallation or other special action is required.


If you’re still using Qubes 4.2, you should upgrade from 4.2 to 4.3 (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.2/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/upgrade/4_3.html) immediately, since Qubes 4.2 has already reached end of life (EOL) (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/06/21/qubes-os-4-2-has-reached-end-of-life/).



In all cases, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate.html) beforehand.

Known issues in Qubes 4.3.2

It’s possible that templates restored in 4.3.2 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos (#8701 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8701)). After restoring such templates in 4.3.2, enter the following additional commands in a dom0 terminal:

sudo qubes-dom0-update -y qubes-dist-upgrade
sudo qubes-dist-upgrade --releasever=4.3 --template-standalone-upgrade -y


This will automatically choose the templates that need to be upgraded. The templates will be shut down during this process.

NovaCustom builds custom laptops, mini PCs, and smartphones with a focus on privacy, security, and customization. They offer the freedom of Dasharo coreboot firmware, true repairability, and a plethora of customization options. Several NovaCustom models are officially certified for Qubes OS (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html).

Conference schedule

We’re also pleased to share the official conference schedule, including a list of sessions and speakers, which you can find here:

https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/schedule/

(Please note that we’re still waiting on a few speakers to confirm their attendance, so this schedule is subject to change.)

On-site tickets are nearly halfway sold out, so if you’d like to join us in person, we recommend getting your tickets soon! See below for details.

When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Lenaustraße 3-4

12047 Berlin

View on OpenStreetMap (https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/263350430)

Attend in person or online

There are three ways to attend the Summit:


In person at Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Requires a paid on-site ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member


Actively participate online

Requires a free virtual ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
For those who are presenting remotely
For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member


Passively view online

No ticket or registration required
For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and recorded videos
Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member




Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

Become a sponsor

If you or your organization are interested in sponsoring Qubes OS Summit 2026 or becoming a Qubes Partner (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/), please contact us at [email protected] (mailto:[email protected]).

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/code-of-conduct.html).

The FPF is a long-standing Qubes Partner (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/). As a nonprofit organization, it is dedicated to supporting and defending public interest journalism. It leads the development of SecureDrop (https://securedrop.org/), an open-source whistleblower submission platform used by more than 50 media organizations around the world to securely accept documents from anonymous sources. FPF uses Qubes OS in the development of an integrated SecureDrop Workstation (https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation).

Qubes OS Summit 2026: Freedom of the Press Foundation and NovaCustom sponsorships; conference schedule available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/27/qubes-os-summit-2026-freedom-of-the-press-foundation-and-novacustom-sponsorships-conference-schedule-available/

We’re proud to announce two new Qubes OS Summit 2026 (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/) sponsorships: Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) (https://freedom.press/) as a Gold tier sponsor and NovaCustom (https://novacustom.com/) as a Silver tier sponsor!

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20state%3Aopen%20type%3ABug%20label%3Aaffects-4.3%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22) in our issue tracker (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/issue-tracking.html).

What’s a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html) and the version scheme (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html) in our documentation.

What’s a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as [major].[minor].[patch]. Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.3) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. See our supported releases (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html) documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

Qubes OS 4.3.2-rc1 is available for testing
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/18/qubes-os-4-3-2-rc1-available-for-testing/

The first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.3.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the release of Qubes 4.3.1.

What’s new in Qubes 4.3.2?


Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 44
kernel-latest upgraded to Linux 7.2
Numerous bug fixes (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20type%3ABug%20label%3A%22affects-4.3%22%20closed%3A2026-06-11..2026-09-18%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22)


When is the stable release?

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict with certainty, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.

Since the changes between 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are relatively minor, we currently don’t anticipate any major problems requiring a second RC. We currently expect to be able to publish the stable 4.3.2 release around the end of September.

How to test Qubes 4.3.2-rc1

If you’d like to help us test (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html) this RC, the best way to do so is by performing a clean installation (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/installation-guide.html) with the new ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/). As always, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate.html) beforehand and updating Qubes OS (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html) immediately afterward in order to apply all available bug fixes.

As an alternative to a clean installation, there’s also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.3.2 is a patch release, it’s essentially Qubes 4.3 inclusive of all updates to date, which largely amounts to just using a fully-updated 4.3 installation. By contrast, a clean installation covers other areas that could also benefit from testing, such as the installation procedure, which is why it’s the recommended testing method.

Regardless of your testing method, please help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/issue-tracking.html). If you’re an experienced user, we encourage you to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190).

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.2

It is possible that templates restored in 4.3.2 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos. This does not affect fresh templates on a clean 4.3.2 installation. For more information, see issue #8701 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8701).

HEI0Vg2Gd3lAewa34zxicNsHlHh7OKsGFI027BxdIpZoEwbLzMThfA0+TH6t/JsN
UEzh9lXD0cpuJIxHe0bSGrJL7kJN5CV9kztstr+YuH3lx52Blq7UAtw/8swvxvBB
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yaJfWvXtoAJQPGrYClbC7D+VYKFYokBbB7c1nabpCzzuJ9uFXuQfHsb7PMYnAJh4
2PLat+BiUxiO3AATHtcrl4DEwRlu7RYW99EB3ax6WUDyxBAVWHnZ8NVoRLgj4bfr
7FJjE0wu8mKT3on0o6RLlifo7mXl1lmXZM6YcB1QD0+/zod0Q6c=
=Zo3p
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software).)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494

part of the file name in most cases. And even when they do control the
full path, many users would likely find such a path suspicious, which
would likely make it more difficult for an attacker to successfully
trick the user into opening such a path.

Discussion
-----------

Normally, we do not issue Qubes security bulletins for purely "in-VM"
vulnerabilities (like this one) that do not involve crossing the VM
security boundary. However, we have decided to make an exception in this
case, since this is a bug in our code and since qvm-open-in-vm is
specifically intended to operate on untrusted input.

While qvm-open-in-vm is designed to be hardened, keep in mind that
handling less trusted data in a more trusted VM still can be risky for
other reasons, for example:

- Unsafe handling of attacker-controlled paths is an easy mistake to
make in the shell.
- A file explorer could render the thumbnail of an untrusted file with
a buggy parser.
- You might accidentally open the file with an application other than
qvm-open-in-vm, exposing the full attack surface of that application.

Patching
---------

The following package contains the security update that addresses the
vulnerability described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.3, in affected templates and standalones:
- qubes-core-agent version 4.3.48

This package will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the package should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

In order for this security update to take effect, all affected templates
must be updated with the package above, then shut down. Afterward, all
qubes based on these templates (including disposables) must be
restarted. All affected standalones must be updated with the package
above.

Credits
--------

This vulnerability was first reported by Giulio Berra. Shortly after, it
was independently reported by Rafal Wojtczuk.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: qsb-119-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmqpVWsACgkQ1lWk8hgw
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cI5xGdY/GT940IP6QO2qHDnVxfU6QMuxEfMy6VSW0GeQ/lFbLco5Edt9UpELJCG2
h1IzyTNgtSm3C6pvrefQs6DL/A39Zl2QST0xTs/ECsJXSE7pc5BL7kO4HnSvSseQ
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oGkRcqio93YkqBArmJd9G1xCn33dJQHd1vffMNoDTNbuZJbrtm4ZhZSVLJ3W3CA0
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EJE3I1b7v3NZoxJ6gXk/+YSWM+E7XbuSrc6f3CYpUue0B6vhHO29xXc71EiFWz1b
1zW4QSBIUd4yEl4B+tH5ZMB3pacSbTQsW1SCTU3I428meTFJW6yjN4cPNruHF2lH
Jz3JQIoKdXohJxruPaCh/ZAEWon+cz7ho98cvwH/x2zi0DoT3cyT6EtTVlD4Dg5c
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=yTNV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmqpXmAACgkQSsGN4REu
FJDGoQ//QmxpMyyFvnG9srj/zYaYuFcyWd7o2lqd4ugEAQVyNJOjAl0GlXnvKVWw
frH+QlZXT/BlQuV6ltzmmh2W5C43JtbBF+O6+Wnc7Imc6bDFf3rjo8xWdx6sptKA
wUVcFX/pO66TTMGjGsSLZNgB6HqZnokdANYpB7MkxxeV6cBPAjFwUoLvDSrba8KG
k8KBdBGw+FJ3Zt4583fW3DwKVJlbtp7SEpQG8HMswU+SHQBKclR+ceye/uwMzoej

QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/15/qsb-119/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 119


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ]===---

2026-09-15

Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

Under certain circumstances (see "Technical details" below), if the user
invokes qvm-open-in-vm (either directly or through the "Edit in
disposable qube" GUI integration) on a file with an attacker-controlled
filename or path, the attacker might be able to execute code in the qube
in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm.

Impact
-------

An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can take
control over the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm.

Affected systems
-----------------

All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Among official Qubes OS
templates, only Debian templates are affected.

Technical details
------------------

When qvm-open-in-vm is invoked with a file (not an URI), the source-side
part of the qrexec call is handled by the qopen-in-vm helper program.
After sending the file content to the other side, qopen-in-vm tries to
open a temporary file alongside the original file in order to save the
response in case the user has edited the file in the target qube. If
creating this file fails (e.g., because the directory is read-only),
qopen-in-vm creates a temporary file in /tmp and shows an error message
to the user. When printing this error message, it incorrectly invokes
the gui_nonfatal function, such that the original filename ends up in a
printf format string, which is unsafe.

For this vulnerability to be exploitable, multiple conditions must be
fulfilled:

1. The attacker must trick the user into using qvm-open-in-vm to open a
file that either
a. has a filename (i.e., the last component of the file's path)
longer than 248 bytes or
b. is located in a directory that is not writable.

2. The path (but not necessarily its last component) must
contain printf-style conversion specifiers (such as '%n').

3. qvm-open-in-vm must not have been invoked with the --view-only flag.

4. The target qube must either
a. send back the file content because its mtime changed (which
usually happens because the user saved the file being edited,
even if merely by overwriting it with the same content) or
b. be compromised by the attacker.

5. The build of qvm-open-in-vm must have been compiled without
_FORTIFY_SOURCE hardening enabled (or set to a level below 2). Due
to an unfortunate interaction between our build script and the way
Debian handles this option, this hardening was not enabled for our
Debian packages. (This problem did not affect our Fedora packages,
for which the hardening was correctly enabled.) With enabled
hardening, the program safely aborts with an error, making the bug
unexploitable.

The first person to report this vulnerability tested its exploitability
on his system. He found that it was successfully exploited in less than
3 % of attempts. Moreover, his demonstration required a very long path
with multiple nested directories and that contained many format
specifiers. In the real world, the attacker may control only the last

If you or your organization are interested in sponsoring Qubes OS Summit 2026 or becoming a Qubes Partner ( https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/), please contact us at [email protected] (mailto:[email protected]).

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct ( https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/code-of-conduct.html).

Qubes OS Summit 2026: Proposals closing soon; tickets still available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/22/qubes-os-summit-2026-proposals-closing-soon-tickets-still-available/

As previously announced ( https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/07/23/qubes-os-summit-2026-tickets-for-sale-and-speaker-proposals-now-open/), the call for proposals ( https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/cfp) for Qubes OS Summit 2026 ( https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/) will end on 2026-08-31. If you’d like to present at the Summit, please submit your proposal soon! As a reminder:


You may present either on site or virtually from anywhere in the world.
If your proposal is accepted and you wish to present in person, you’ll be issued an on-site ticket free of charge, no purchase necessary.
If you select “Don’t record this session” when submitting your proposal, your presentation will not be livestreamed or recorded. Online attendees will not be able to view it.


When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

(A more specific schedule will be published after the speaker lineup is finalized.)

Refugio Berlin ( https://refugio.berlin/)

Lenaustraße 3-4

12047 Berlin

View on OpenStreetMap ( https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/263350430)

Attend in person or online

There are three ways to attend the Summit:


In person at Refugio Berlin ( https://refugio.berlin/)

Requires a paid on-site ticket ( https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member


Actively participate online

Requires a free virtual ticket ( https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
For those who are presenting remotely
For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member


Passively view online

No ticket or registration required
For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and recorded videos
Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member




Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

Conference schedule

We’re still reviewing proposals from prospective presenters, so the list of talks has not been decided yet. We’ll publish a detailed conference schedule after the speaker lineup has been finalized.

Become a sponsor

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.


Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).


In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: canary-048-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=wcFj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: canary-048-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=vexT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: canary-048-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/) is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong.

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Qubes Canary 048
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/09/canary-048/

We have published Qubes Canary 048 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 048


---===[ Qubes Canary 048 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is September 09, 2026.

2. There have been 118 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2026. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Wed, 09 Sep 2026 06:09:30 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Fake Jewish Lineage: The Passport Scheme that Exploited Germany’s Nazi History
BYD, Geely, Xpeng: Germany’s Vaunted Auto Industry in Dire Straits Amid Chinese Surge
Amodei vs. Altman: How the Race for AI Dominance Is Increasing the Risks
Boats from Eastern Libya: How Europe Is Bowing to a Libyan Warlord on Migration
Moaning for the Mainland: How Taiwan Satisfies China's Lust for Pornography

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
AfD’s Far Right Win Puts New Pressure on Germany’s Leader Merz
Chinese Ship Takes Arctic Shortcut: Smart Business? Or a Political Flex?
Israeli Allies Ban Trade With Settlements as U.K. Cites ‘Ethnic Cleansing’
Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis Edge Back to the Brink of War
Carney Says Retaliation Against U.S. Tariffs Was Unavoidable

Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
US strikes Iranian oil tankers as Tehran targets American base in Jordan
Paul Adams: British-Israeli relations at lowest ebb in decades
US slaps import ban on Canadian alcohol, motorbikes and other goods
'Constantly on my mind' - 9/11 agony endures for bereaved, 25 years on
South Park creators rename show 'South America' in apparent dig at Trump

Source: http://Blockchain.info/
000000000000000000017721d9b2add64d85980a3bb8587851798bb854c3d514


Footnotes
----------

XSAs released on 2026-09-08
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/08/xsas-released-on-2026-09-08/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-509 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-509.html): Denial of service only.
XSA-510 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-510.html): Denial of service only.
XSA-511 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-511.html): Qubes OS does not use XSM silo.
XSA-512 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-512.html): Qubes OS does not use oxenstored.
XSA-513 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-513.html): Qubes OS does not use tapdisk.


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.